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ABSTRACT
We introduce a feature-based sampling method to detect
anomalous patterns. By recognizing that an observation
is considered normal because there are many observations
similar to it, we formally define the problem of anomalous
pattern detection. The properties of normal and anoma-
lous patterns allow us to devise a generic framework using
the sampling method to quickly prune the normal observa-
tions. Observations that can not form significant patterns
are anomalous. Rules that are learned from the dataset are
used to construct the patterns for which we compute a score
function to measure the interestingness of the anomalous
patterns. Experiments using the KDD Cup 99 dataset show
that our approach can discover most of the attack patterns.
Those attacks are in the top set of anomalous patterns and
have a higher score than the patterns of normal connections.
The experiments also show that the algorithm can run in
near linear time.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Management]: Applications - Data Min-
ing
Keywords
Data Mining, Unusual Pattern Detection, Outlier Detection
1. INTRODUCTION
Outlier detection, which aims at detecting abnormal ob-
servations, has became an interesting topic in data mining.
Historically, outliers were considered noise that would ad-
versely affect the output of the data analysis process and
would need to be removed from the dataset. However, the
deviation of outliers from other data may indicate interesting
or fraudulent activities that require our attention instead of
simply discarding them [6]. In practice, an outlier detection
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method can be used as an unsupervised technique for fraud-
ulent activity detection, network instrusion detection and
system monitoring. Outlier detection methods can be di-
vided into two categories: statistical-based [6] and distance-
based [4]. The statistical based approach can discover out-
liers by computing the probability of the observation from
the underlying distributions of the dataset. However, those
distributions are usually unknown in the data mining appli-
cations. In constrast, the distance based approach [4] can
detect the outliers without knowing the underlying distribu-
tions. Recently, Breunig et al [2] has introduced the concept
of a local outlier factor known as a density-based approach
that could be used to detect outliers. However, current out-
lier detection approaches still have limitations. First, the
data distribution in high dimensional space is sparse [1, 12]
which makes most items appear as outliers. Second, the in-
tersting observations may not be the top outliers. Those
two problems lead to a very high false alarm rate in practice
which makes the study of outliers non-trivial. The examples
in the motivation section illustrate the scenario that some
anomalous observations are undetectable by the distance-
based or density-based approach.
In this paper, we introduce another type of anomalous ob-
servation and the support metric used to discover and rank
the interesting anomalous observations. From our perspec-
tive, the anomalous observations can simply be noise due
to data sparsity in a high dimensional space [1, 12]. In a
large dataset, it is possible for some items to randomly de-
viate from the normal values making them outliers. For that
noise, the possibility to form patterns is low due to the na-
ture of randomness. Thus, the anomalous observations be-
come interesting when they form patterns. The significance
of those anomalous patterns is supported by the number of
items in the pattern. One possible approach to discover the
pattern of the outliers is to apply a clustering algorithm on
the set of outliers. However, as shown in our experiments,
when the outliers are removed from the dataset, the cluster-
ing on the outliers will not reveal the true patterns of the
abnormal observations. Another alternative approach is to
apply the density-based clustering algorithm on the entire
dataset or the top outliers of the dataset. The small clusters
are the anomalous patterns. This approach still has two lim-
itations. First, the abnormal observations can be grouped
into the bigger clusters. Second, the algorithms will return a
high number of small clusters which makes the identification
of the interesting patterns difficult.
The content of this paper is organized as follows. The mo-
tivation section presents the type of anomalous observations
that can not be detected by LOF, a well-known local based
outlier detection approach [2]. The problem is formally de-
fined in the formal definition section. The framework for the
algorithm, the running time complexity and the method for
setting the parameters are described in the framework sec-
tion. In the next section, the performance of the method and
the comparisons with other possible alternatives are evalu-
ated. The running time of the algorithm is evaluated in the
performance section.
2. MOTIVATION
We consider an example in table 1a to illustrate another
type of anomaly. The table consists of four items with three
attributes A1, A2 and A3. Table 3 shows the pair-wise dis-
tance between the items. In table 4, each column contains
the statistics for the item in the column. The rows in the
table show the k-distance [2] with k = 3, the average dis-
tance of all KNNs (3 nearest neighbors) and the LOF factor
of the item. We assume that the set of four items is a subset
of a larger dataset with the range of the attributes from 0 to
1000. Thus, normalization to compute LOF is unneccessary.
According to table 4, X1 and X2 are highly ranked outliers
due to their LOF score and X4 is the lowest ranked outlier in
the group. X1 and X2 are more unusual than X4. A closer
look at table 1a shows that this is not necessarily true. Ac-
cording to the table, the values for attributes A2 and A3 are
actually almost similar for all the items. The values vary
uniformly from 150 to 350. The items are similar in term of
A2 and A3.
ID A1 A2 A3
X1 8 250 300
X2 9 250 250
X3 10 350 150
X4 50 300 200
(a) Example 1
ID A1 A2 A3
X1 8 250 300
X2 9 250 250
X3 10 350 150
X4 50 300 200
X5 20 270 800
X6 30 280 850
X7 40 300 700
X8 50 350 750
X9 20 900 250
X10 30 800 350
X11 40 850 300
X12 50 850 250
(b) Example 2
Table 1: Examples 1 and 2
For atttribute A1, there are two distinct groups: the group
of X1, X2 and X3 with the mean of 9 and a group of X4.
The first attribute of X4 deviates significantly from the other
items in the table. It is five times greater than the average
of group of X1, X2 and X3. Despite this abnormality, X4 is
considered less of an outlier than X1 and X2 according to the
definition of LOF. Even though the range of A1 is smaller
than those in A2 and A3, the deviation is significant. In this
example, X4 is unusual whereas X1, X2 and X3 are normal.
We consider two possible alternative approaches to dis-
cover the unusual item X4. The first approach is to compute
the LOF on the random combinations of the attributes [9]
with the expectation that the outliers that are overlooked
ID A1 A2 A3
X1 8 250 300
X2 9 250 250
X3 10 350 150
X4 50 300 200
X13 40 250 350
X14 30 250 350
(a) Example 3
ID A1 A2 A3
X1 8 250 300
X2 9 250 250
X3 10 350 150
X4 50 300 200
X13 40 250 350
X14 30 250 350
X15 20 250 350
X16 15 250 350
(b) Example 4
Table 2: Examples 3 and 4
Table 3: Distance Matrix
X1 X2 X3 X4
X1 0 50.01 180.29 119.43
X2 50.01 0 141.42 81.74
X3 180.29 141.42 0 81.24
X4 119.43 81.74 81.24 0
in the entire feature space can be revealed in the subspace
of the dataset. An example in table 1b shows that such a
subspace may not exist. In this example, the dataset has 8
additional items. As we can see, the items form 3 distinct
groups. X1, X2, X3 and X4 belong to one group. X5, X6,
X7 and X8 belong to the same group for their high values
in A3. X9, X10, X11 and X12 are in another group for their
high values in A2. In the subspace of A1 and A2, X4 is in
the group of X5, X6, X7 and X8 and in the subspace of A1
and A3, X4 is in the group of X9, X10, X11 and X12. In
those cases and other possible subspaces, X4 is not unusual.
The example illustrates that such a subspace where the de-
viation of the anomalous observations is revealed may not
exist. Another approach is to compare the attributes for the
items in the KNN list. In example 1, X1, X2 and X3 are
KNNs of X4. Since the value on A1 of X4 is distinct from
that of X1, X2 and X3, it is tempting to conclude that X4
is unusual. However, example 3 shows that it is not true.
In this example, X4 is normal with respect to X13 and X14
even though X13 and X14 are not in the KNN list of X4. The
conclusion based on the deviation of item from its KNNs on
some attributes is incorrect.
The examples show the scenarios where anomalous records
are undetectable by the typical distance-based outlier de-
tection approach. In the next section, we formally define
the problem and introduce a method to detect this type of
anomalous observation.
3. FORMAL DEFINITIONS
We extend the definitions of the relational algebra to in-
corporate the concept of interval tuple and the operations
Table 4: Metrics
X1 X2 X3 X4
k-distance 180.29 141.42 180.29 119.43
Mean 116.58 91.06 134.32 94.14
LOF Score 1.55 1.55 1.34 1.27
on the interval tuple. Recall that a relation R consists of n
attributes A1, . . . , An, a tuple t of R is an ordered list of val-
ues corresponding to the attributes. The notation t.Ai refers
to attribute Ai of tuple t. Where applicable, we drop the
attribute name and use the subscript, i.e. ti, to refer to the
attribute in order to simplify the definitions. In addition,
we use the terms feature and attribute interchangably.
First, we introduce the concept of an interval-tuple and
the interval based selection operation. An interval is a set
of real numbers bounded by two end points, which can be
represented by [a, b]. Definitions 1 and 2 provide a conve-
nient way to query the relation R with respect to a given
set of intervals. In example 1a, a relation R consists of
X1, X2, X3 and X4. The operation σI(R) and σI1(R)
on I ≡ {[7, 10], [250, 250], [250, 350]} return {X1, X2} and
{X1, X2, X3} respectively. S ≡ {X1, X2} is covered by I .
Definition 1. An n-interval tuple I for a relation R is
an ordered list of n intervals I ≡ < I1, · · · , In >, where
each interval Ii ⊆ dom(Ai). The i
th interval of I is refered
as Ii. Ii is an interval of I on attribute Ai.
Definition 2. An interval selection operation σ on an
n-interval tuple I for a relation R, denoted by σI(R), selects
a subset S of the tuples from R such that each t in the subset
satisfies the following condition: ti ∈ Ii ,∀Ii 6= NULL. We
say that S is covered by I, I is a cover interval-tuple of S
and Ii is a cover interval of S. If I has only one interval,
say Ii, σIi(R) can be used. In this case, we say σIi(R) is an
interval selection operation on interval Ii for R.
Definition 3. A cover interval-tuple I of a relation S is
minimal if Ii is the smallest interval that covers S, ∀Ii 6= ∅.
Definition 4. ω(R) is an interval operation on relation
R that returns a minimal interval tuple I for R.
The function ω in definition 4 is an inverse function of the
function σ on the same relation. In the example above, ω(S)
returns J ≡ {[8, 9], [250, 250], [250, 300]}.
Definition 5. α function between two interval-tuples on
attribute i is defined by:
α(Ii, Ji) =
max(inf Ii, inf Ji)−min(sup Ii, sup Ji)
min(sup Ii, supJi)
, (1)
if Ii ∩ Ji ≡ ∅
and α(Ii, Ji) = 0 if Ii ∩ Ji 6= ∅ (2)
The function α measures the dissimarity between two in-
terals on an attribute i based on the ratio of the differ-
ence between two intervals instead of the distance between
two intervals. When the ratio on all the attributes for two
interval-tuple I and J is small, those two interval-tuples are
considered close. This concept is used to define the closeness
between any two sets as below:
Definition 6. Two sets S and S′ are close under αc,
denoted by close(S, S′/αc) ≡ true if and only if α(ωi(S),
ωi(S
′)) < αc,∀i ∈ 1 . . . n.
Definition 7. Given P = {Si}, if ∀Si ∈ P , there is
at least one Sj ∈ P such that Si and Sj are close under
αc, we say {Si} forms a pattern P under αc. We define
supp(P ) =
P
|Si| as the support of P.
We consider example 4 in table 2b which has two sets S1 ≡
{X1, X2, X3} and S2 ≡ {X4, X13, X14, X15, X16}. Accord-
ing to definition 7, S1 and S2 form a pattern. As we see, X1
and X4 are in the same pattern, even though X1 and X4 are
dissimilar. Definition 7 implies the chain property that can
result in very high support patterns. The property is used
to define the normality and abnormality as follows:
Definition 8. We say a pattern P is normal under Nn
if supp(P ) > Nu
Definition 9. We say a pattern P is anomalous under
Nu if supp(P ) ≤ Nu
When a set of observations can form a large pattern even
though two items in the pattern are very different, those
observations are normal. The set of observations that can
not form a large pattern and are disconnected from other
observations are anomalous. From those definitions, we have
the following properties:
Property 1. An observation t is normal if and only if t
belongs to a pattern P such that supp(P ) > Nu.
Property 2. An observation t is abnormal if and only if
t does not belong to any pattern P such that supp(P ) > Nu.
Property 3. The normal observations account for the
majority of the dataset.
With these properties, we can construct an unusual pattern
detection framework based on a sampling method as follows:
• Given an item t, we create a sample of items that are
likely to be similar to t by using some likelihood metric.
• Since most items are normal, it is likely that the items
in the sample will form patterns.
• If t follows a pattern, there exists a pattern that con-
tains t.
• If a pattern is highly supported, all the items in the
pattern are disregarded as normal items.
• The low supported patterns are flagged as candidates
for unusual pattern.
• We then try to match those unusual patterns with
other normal patterns. If a match can be found for
a candidate, it will be disregarded. Otherwise, the un-
matched candidates are unusual patterns.
Property 1 allows the possibility of using a sampling tech-
nique to rule out a normal pattern without comparing an
item with all other items in the dataset. In other words,
it is possible to devise an algorithm to detect the unusual
patterns in linear time. In this paper, we sample the dataset
based on the attributes to discover the patterns according
to the framework mentioned above.
We use an interval splitting function fS to divide a set of
tuples into smaller sets. First, the split function on a rela-
tion R divides each column into at least k intervals. Each
interval is split into smaller intervals if the ratio of the differ-
ence between two consecutive ordered values from R on the
same column in the interval is greater than αs. The combi-
nations of the intervals from different attributes constitute
the interval-tuples. We use fS(R/k, αs) to denote the set of
interval-tuples returned from the split function on relation
R.
The sampling is then performed as follows:
Given an interval Ii on attribute i, we select a sample R
from dataset D such that R ≡ σIi(D). We then perform the
split function fS on R to obtain the set of interval-tuples
V ≡ fS(R/k, αs). For each interval tuple I ∈ V , we cre-
ate a set of tuples S from R where S ≡ σI(R). If S does
not satisfy the condition |fSi (S/αs)| = 1,∀i, which means
S can be divided into smaller sets, we split interval tuple I
into smaller interval tuples by performing the split function
fS(S/k = 1, αs) on S. The value of one for k means that we
only split an interval when there is a change of the values
in the interval. We say {S} are the rules generated from
sample R since all the items in the same rule are similar.
The rules are used to create patterns. As we can see, an
observation can be in different rules depending on the cho-
sen sample. In general, the normal observations are in the
normal patterns. In the algorithm, we compare the unusual
patterns against other normal patterns and try to merge the
unusual patterns. Therefore, the normal observations that
are mistakenly flagged as anomalous will be grouped into
the normal patterns.
In example 2, the split function on attributes A1, A2
and A3 with k = 2 and αs = 2 returns the sets of inter-
vals: {[8, 30], [30, 50]}, {[250, 300], [350, 350], [800, 900]} and
{[150, 300], [300, 350], [700, 850]} respectively. The items are
then grouped into 8 rules {X1, X2, X3}, {X4}, {X5, X6},
{X7}, {X8}, {X9}, {X10}, {X11, X12}. According to defini-
tion 7, we have the following patterns generated from the
rules: {{X1, X2, X3}}, {{X4}}, {{X5, X6}, {X7}, {X8}},
{{X9}, {X10}, {X11, X12}}.
We introduce a score metric to determine the significance
of the detected pattern. The unusual patterns having the
same support with higher score are more interesting. Defi-
nition 10 defines the score between two interval tuples. The
score of a pattern against another pattern is the smallest
score between the two interval tuples of the patterns. As we
see, the score of an unusual pattern is used to measure the
deviation of an unusual observation from the normal obser-
vation. Thus, the score of an unusual pattern is the smallest
score between it and the normal patterns.
Definition 10. o-score function between two interval tu-





Definition 11. The o-score between two patterns P and




Definition 12. Given a set of normal patterns {Pi}, the




o-score(P ,P ′) (5)
4. FRAMEWORK
The outline for the algorithm is shown in algorithm 1.
The algorithm consists of n rounds where n is the number
of attributes. In the ith round, the makeSamples function
creates a set of samples from dataset D on attribute i. In
this implementation, the samples are created as follows. The
data set is sorted on attribute i and divided into chunks of
the size Nc. Each chunk R is a sample from which to learn
rules on attribute i.
The split function fS(R/k, αs) outputs a set V of interval-
tuples. The set of rules {S} are created for each interval-
tuple I ∈ V . The makePatterns function merges all the rules
and outputs a set NP of normal patterns a and set UP of
unusual pattern candidates according to definition 7, 8 and
9. The unusual score for all unusual pattern candidates are
also computed against set NP from line 11 to line 13.
The algorithm from line 3 to line 13 creates the normal
patterns and unusual pattern candidates for each sample R.
As discussed in the introduction, we need to rule out the
normal patterns. Variable P at line 14 contains the set of
unusual pattern candidates. For each candidate p ∈ P , p will
be removed from P if there exists a normal pattern pn ∈ UP
such that p and pn are close under αc (line 14). This is done
since those candidates are shown to be normal in another
pattern. For the first round, no action is performed on UP
from line 15 to 16 and all the unusual pattern candidates
are put into P. P contains the set of candidates for the first
attribute. The items which do not belong to any pattern in
this set of candiates are normal.
For the next rounds, the unusual pattern candidates will
be removed from UP if they are not in P (line 15) because
they were flagged as normal. The function at line 16 com-
bines the unusual pattern candidates into larger patterns
according to the close function under parameter αc. The
candidates which are normal after the combination are re-
moved from P. The new unusual score of each new pattern
is the lowest score from the candidates for which the new
pattern is created. When the computation is finished for
all rounds, all the unsual pattern candidates in P that do
not match any normal pattern or do not have the support
sufficient enough to be normal are unsual patterns.
The close and score functions are computed from the α
function which requires the dividends to be non zero. For
each round, we replace the zeros with the average of the next
c items when the dataset is sorted on attribute i. The zeros
can be replaced by 0.5 if the dataset contains only 0 and 1
for attribute i.
4.1 Parameter Setting
The algorithm consists of five parameters: αc, αs, k, Nc,
Nu, which can be determined intuitively. Nu is a user-
defined parameter indicating the size of a pattern to be con-
sidered unusual. Nc is the sample size. k is choosen based
on the number of possible patterns in a sample. The num-
ber of patterns increases in the sample when k increases.
However, if those patters are similar, they will be combined
together eventually. The value of k does not impact the out-
put significantly. Typically, k can be around 4 and Nc can
be computed from k ×Nu. Besides k, αs is used to split an
interval if there is an abnormal change in the interval. The
parameter αc defines the cutoff point for the anomalous ob-
servations. Heuristically, we can choose αc and αs between
0.3 and 0.6.
4.2 Running-time Complexity
We denote |NP |, |UP | and |P | as the total number of
items in NP , UP and P respectively. From line 5 to 9, it
Algorithm 1 Rule-based Pseudocode
1: procedure RuleBase(D)
2: for all i ∈ n do
3: U ← makeSamples(D, i)
4: for all R ∈ U do
5: V ← fS(R/k, αs)
6: for all I ∈ L do
7: S ← makeRules(R,I)
8: put S into RP
9: end for
10: makePatterns(RP,NP, UP )
11: for all p ∈ UP do
12: compute o-score(p, NP )
13: end for
14: P ← matchNorm(NP, P )
15: UP ← matchUnusual(UP, P )




takes O(Nc) time to make the rules. The makePattern func-
tion needs to combine all the patterns which has a worst case
of O(N2c ). The running time from line 11 to 13 is O(|UP | ×
|NP |). We can use the hashtables to store patterns for NP,
UP and NP in order to execute the matching functions (line
14, 15) in linear time with respect to the number of items.
The execution time for the two lines are O(min(|NP |, |P |))
and O(min(|UP |, |P |)) respectively. Since |NP | + |UP | =
Nc, the execution time for them is less than O(Nc). The
running time for line 16 is O(|UP |× |P |). The total running
time from line 3 to 16 is O(Nc + N
2
c + |UP | × |NP |+ Nc +
|UP | × |P |). Since Nc and |UP | ∗ |NP | are less than N
2
c ,
the formula can be reduced to O(max(N2c , |UP | × |P |)). In
general N2c is small and does not grow with the dataset and
|UP | × |P | is small on the average. The running time can
be considered constant, O(c).
There are n rounds. It takes O(NlogN) time to sort the
data according to the attribute of the current round. Each
round has N
Nc
chunks and the execution time for each chunk
is O(c). Therefore, the total execution time is O(c × n ×
N
Nc
+ n×NlogN). When we replace ( c
Nc
+ logN) by ς , the
formula can be written as O(ς ×n×N). The formula shows
that the algorithm can be executed in almost linear time.
5. EXPERIMENTS
We ran experiments using the KDD CUP 99 Network
Connections Data Set from the UCI repository [11]. The
data was compiled from a wide variety of intrusions simu-
lated in a military network environment prepared by MIT
Lincoln Labs. Each record has 42 features containing the
network connection information. Among them, 34 features
are continuous and 8 features are symbolic. The last fea-
ture labels the type of connection. About 80% of the data
set are normal connections and 20% are attack connections.
To make the experiment realistic, we create a new dataset
with a very low number of attacks randomly drawn from the
KDD Cup Dataset to test whether the small patterns would
be discarded by the sampling method in a large dataset. The
new dataset contains 95,174 normalized connections in to-
tal and the total number of attacks account for only 2.2% of
Table 5: List of Attacks
Type #attacks Type #attacks
pod 210 bufferoverflow 30
ipsweep 209 land 21
warezclient 203 warezmaster 20
portsweep 200 imap 12
nmap 200 rootkit 10
smurf 200 loadmodule 9
satan 197 ftp write 8
neptune 196 multihop 7
teardrop 179 phf 4
back 168 perl 3























Figure 1: LOF Precision-Recall (PR) Curve.
the dataset. To make the experimental results less biased by
the possible special characteristics of some types of attack,
the data set contains 22 types of attack with the number
of records for each attack type varying from 2 to 210. The
attack with the largest size accounts for only 0.2% of the
dataset. The details of the number of connections for each
attack are shown in table 5.
5.1 Competing Methods
First, we run an oultier detection algorithm on the dataset
to obtain the list of outliers. In this experiment, we use the
LOF algorithm [2]. The records with high LOF score are
considered as outliers. The score is computed based on the
min ptsth nearest neighbor [2]. The score is sensitive to the
choice of min pts. With small min pts, the group of outliers
may not be discovered. With large min pts, the outliers in
small clusters can be identified as normal because of the
smoothing effect.
Figure 1 shows the LOF precision/recall curve for differ-
ent values of min pts. Generally, min pts = 100 performs
better than the other two values of min pts. As we see,
LOF obtains the highest precision rate (56%) when the re-
call rate = 2.6%. When the recall rate reaches 20%, the
precision rate drops dramastically to 10%.
Since the precision is low for high recall rate, we apply
clustering algorithms on the outliers to group them into their
corresponding attack types. First, we ran KMEAN on top
outliers which account for 10% of the dataset. There are 40
clusters. We then filtered the output by removing clusters
with the size greater than 250. There are 30 such clusters.
Table 6: Top outliers (10%) Clustered by KMEAN
ID Rank Size Connections Rate(%)
1 7 159 neptune 95.0
portsweep 1.3
2 12 114 satan 0.9
teardrop 89.5
ipsweep 0.9
3 13 110 nmap 100.0
4 16 107 smurf 73.8
5 18 101 satan 1.0
ipsweep 4.0
portsweep 87.1
Table 7: Top outliers (10%) Clustered by SNN
ID Rank Size Connections Rate(%)
1 9 78 neptune 100.0
2 15 58 smurf 77.6
3 16 56 smurf 100.0
Ten of them have at least 50% of attack. Table 6 shows
the corresponding rank of first five clusters that contain the
attack connections. As we can see, 13 out of 18 top clusters
do not contain any attack.
In the next experiment, we used a shared nearest neighbor
(SNN) clustering algorithm to cluster the top outliers. SNN
returns one cluster of size 3814 and 292 clusters of size less
than 143. There are 19 clusters with the size from 50 to 143.
Table 7 shows top three clusters that contains the attack
connections. The first attack cluster ranks 9th and its size
is 78. In those two experiments, the attack connections are
not shown as strong unusual patterns.
Since the clustering on the top outliers could not detect all
the top ten groups of attack. We want to cluster the entire
dataset with the hope that those groups can be discovered.
It is difficult to set the parameter k for KMEAN in this large
dataset. With large k, KMEAN will return many clusters
whereas small values of k may group the normal connections
with attack connections. Therefore, we used SNN for this
experiment since it can discover small clusters with different
densities in large datasets [5] without requiring prior number
of clusters as the input. The algorithm returns 131 clusters
with the size from 50 to 250. Among them, there are six
clusters that contain attack connections (see table 8). The
first cluster that contains the attack connections is ranked
35th. As we can see, the attack and normal connections are
divided into smaller clusters. The attack patterns are not
shown clearly in this experiment. The result shows that even
Table 8: SNN on the entire dataset
ID Rank Size Connections Rate(%)
1 35 112 nmap 100.0
2 57 89 warezclient 73.0
rootkit 1.1
3 74 79 neptune 100.0
4 90 65 ipsweep 100.0
5 112 59 smurf 78.0
6 118 58 smurf 100.0
Table 9: Parameter Setting
Nu 250 αc 0.5
k 4 αs 0.5
Nc 1200
Table 10: Top 10 Unusual Patterns Ordered by Size
Rank Size Score Connections Rate(%)
1 243 24.1 smurf 79.4
normal 20.6
2 192 43.6 nmap 100
3 170 12.9 normal 100
4 169 203.5 satan 100
5 150 104.1 neptune 100
6 129 26.1 ipsweep 100
7 114 14.2 back 100
8 84 6.5 warezclient 100
9 72 15.6 normal 100
10 67 107.7 portsweep 100
though SNN can discover small clusters, they will return
many of them.
5.2 Our Method
In the next experiment, we ran our method on the dataset
to discover the unusual patterns. We set the parameters ac-
cording to the parameter setting from the algorithm section
(see table 9).
The algorithm returns 20 unsual patterns with the size
of at least 50. Table 10 shows top 10 unusual patterns by
size. The size of those patterns varies from 67 to 243. The
first two patterns are of attack type. Seventy percent of
those patterns contain 100% of attacks. The other 9 smaller
patterns containing attacks are shown in table 11. According
to table 10, we see that satan, neptune and portsweep follow
strong patterns. In the table, we see that warezclient attacks
also follow a pattern but its score is low (6.5) in relative to
those attack types, which means that its pattern is slightly
different from normal patterns.
As mentioned above, the data set contains 10 attack pat-
terns with the size of at least 100. In our method, eight of
ten are identified in the top unusual patterns (by size).
Table 13 shows the recall rate for each attack type found
in table 10. With the low false alarm rate, we still get a high
recall rate.
We then take all the unusual patterns with the size of
at least 50 and order them by score. Table 12 shows the
ranking, score and attack type of the patterns. According to
Table 11: Other Unusual Patterns Contain the Attacks
Rank Size Score Connections Rate(%)
13 66 11.8 teardrop 100
14 64 54. pod 100
20 50 48.8 pod 100
22 48 83.1 guesspwd 100
23 44 156.6 neptune 100
33 31 20.0 teardrop 100
35 29 30.0 back 100
Table 12: Unusual Patterns Ordered by Score
Rank Type Score Size
1 satan 203.5 169
2 portsweep 107.7 67
3 neptune 104.1 150
4 pod 54.6 64
5 pod 48.8 50
6 nmap 43.6 192
7 normal 29.6 54
8 normal 26.2 63
9 ipsweep 26.1 127
10 normal 25.9 59
11 smurf 24.1 243
12 normal 15.6 72
13 normal 14.9 64
14 back 14.2 114
15 normal 12.87 170
16 teardrop 11.8 66
17 normal 10.5 67
18 normal 9.7 56
19 warezclient 6.6 84
20 normal 4.2 67
the table, our method correctly identifies some of the attacks
in the first six unusual patterns. All of these patterns have
the detection rate of 100%. Among them, the attack type
of Satan has the highest score which is 203.5. The score of
the first normal connection pattern in the table is only 29.6
and its size is only 54.
In ranking either by size or by score (after the patterns
with very low size are pruned), we can see that the attack
types of satan, portsweep, neptune, and nmap can be dis-
covered well by our approach. The results imply that these
types of attack follows some patterns which are strongly dif-
ferent from normal connections.
Figure 2 shows the PR curve of our method versus LOF.
The figure shows that our method yields a precision rate of
80% at very low recall rates. The method outperforms the
LOF approach. Since we quickly prune the patterns with the
unusual score below the cutoff threshold, the attacks with
very low unsual score were removed from the output. That
is why the figure only shows the recall rate up to 90%. How-
ever, this does not affect the result much since the precision
rate is usually low at this recall rate.
According to the experiments, the following interesting
observations are found. Most unsual patterns with normal
connections do not form highly supported patterns. Even
though they may have high scores, they appeared as very
low support patterns, whereas the attack connections form
patterns with high support. The normal connections that
can form patterns with high support tend to have a very low
score. Few discovered unusual patterns have mixed results.
Another important observation is that the number of un-
usual patterns with high support is very small.
In conclusion, we have performed a variety of experiments
with different combinations of outlier detection and density-
based clustering algorithms. The precision is low when the
recall rate increases to 20%. For the clustering algorithms,
the normal connections were also grouped into small clus-
ters. However, our algorithm grouped the attack and normal
Table 13: The Recall Rate of the Attack Types in Top 10
Patterns
Type Rate Type Rate
smurf 96.5 back 67.9
nmap 96 ipsweep 61.2
satan 85.8 warezclient 41.4
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Figure 2: Precision-Recall (PR) Curve.
connections almost correctly according to their connection
type even though there are 22 types of attacks and their
size is small. They are shown clearly as unusual patterns in
terms of size and score.
6. PERFORMANCE
We implement a memory-based version of the algorithm in
Java. For each round, the dataset can be sorted in O(NlogN)
time. We use a hashtable data structure to store the list
of unusual candidate items so that the matching functions,
matchNorm and matchUnusual, can be performed in con-
stant time. At first, we ran the program with different ini-
tial attributes. The number of unusual candidates vary from
30K to 60K. During the first round, we don’t combine the
unusual patterns, therefore, the performance is not affected.
In the next few rounds, the matching functions reduce the
number of unusual items dramatically before the combining
step.
Figure 3 shows the performance of the algorithm with
different random orders of the attributes. According to the






































Figure 4: Running time for the algorithm.
the running time significantly. Also, the results are almost
the same for different orders of the attributes. The attack
connections are consistently in the top unusual patterns.
In the next experiment, we ran the program on the KDD
dataset with the size varying from 40K to 200K. Figure 4
shows that the execution time of the program is linear with
the growth of the data size. By replacing the memory-based
hashtable data structure and merge sort algorithm with the
disk-based versions, the algorithm can be used for any large
dataset.
7. RELATED WORK
Outlier detection has been extensively studied in the field
of statistics [6]. The method relies on using the underly-
ing distribution of the dataset to detect the outliers. The
limitations of the statistical-based approach is that the un-
derlying distribution is usually unknown and that approach
does not perform well in high dimensions. The distance-
based approach can discover outliers without knowing the
underlying distribution [4, 2]. However, we have shown that
there are cases where the anomalous observations can not
be detected by the distance-based approach.
Recently, a method [3] was introduced to discover anamolous
records in categorical datasets by performing the conditional
probability tests on combinations of the attribute values.
The test requires that the values must be discretized into
the set of values. Hence, it is more suitable for the categor-
ical dataset.
Density-based clustering methods cluster the dataset based
on the local density of the nearby items. The nearby items
with the same density are clustered together [5, 7]. Density-
based clustering can discover the clusters with different sizes
and shapes [5]. The main difference between this approach
and our unusual pattern detection is that this method fo-
cuses on clustering the dataset, whereas our approach fo-
cuses on discovering the unusual pattern. The items that
are normal are quickly removed from the learning process.
As a result, our algorithm can run faster without dividing
the data set into small clusters.
8. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a fast detection algorithm that can
discover anomalous observations. From our perspective, the
unusual items become interesting when they form small pat-
terns. By using the properties of normal and unusual obser-
vations, we have developed a sampling method to rule out
the normal observations in order to detect unusual patterns.
The algorithm generates the rules from the samples. We
then combine the rules into patterns. When a pattern gains
high support, the pattern is normal and all the items in
the pattern are discarded. The unusual patterns are ranked
by their support. In the experiments, we have compared
our algorithm with other possible alternatives, namely out-
lier detection and clustering, to discover unusual patterns.
According to the results, our approach yields the highest de-
tection rate with the most unusual items grouped into the
correct corresponding patterns. We have also introduced the
score function to measure the degree of deviation of the un-
usual pattern from the normal patterns. The running time
complexity of the algorithm is O(ζ × d × N) where ζ is a
constant. The experiments confirm that our algorithm can
run fast in near linear time.
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